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IN DEFENSE OF THE KALAM 
COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT 
William Lane Craig 
Graham Oppy's attempt to show that the critiques of the kalam cosmologi-
cal argument offered by Griinbaum, Davies, and Hawking are successful is 
predicated upon a misunderstanding of the nature of defeaters in rational 
belief. Neither Grunbaum nor Oppy succeed in showing an incoherence in 
the Christian doctrine of creation. Oppy's attempts to rehabilitate Davies's 
critique founders on spurious counter-examples and unsubstantiated 
claims. Oppy's defense of Hawking's critique fails to allay suspicions about 
the reality of imaginary time and finally results in the denial of tense and 
temporal becoming. 
Introduction 
Graham Oppy maintains that, despite my replies, the critiques of the 
kalam cosmological argument offered by A. Griinbaum, P. Davies, and S. 
Hawking succeed in showing that kalam arguments are not "rationally 
compelling pieces of natural theology.'" The phrase is reminiscent of 
Alvin Plantinga's disclaimer about the ontological argument.2 Indeed, 
like Plantinga, Oppy differentiates between an argument's being a suc-
cessful piece of natural theology and an argument's being sound or 
being rationally held to be sound. In order for the above-named critics 
to succeed in showing that kalam arguments are not rationally com-
pelling pieces of natural theology, all they must do is show "that there is 
no good, non-question-begging reason for them to be persuaded that the 
arguments ... are sound."3 
These introductory comments by Oppy suggest that the issue before 
us concerns the role of defeaters of prima facie warranted beliefs.' The 
kalam cosmological argument is an exercise in positive apologetics aimed 
at proving that God exists. It may be formulated as follows: 
1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause. 
2. The universe began to exist. 
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause. 
Conceptual analysis of what it is to be cause of the universe will recover 
several of the principal attributes of God, so that the cause takes on the 
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character of a personal Creator of the universe. 
In order to remove the warrant provided by the argument for its con-
clusion, the argument's detractor must either expose a fallacy in its logi-
cal inference form or defeat at least one of its premises. Refutatory 
defeaters brought against the premises may be either rebutting defeaters 
which aim to show that the relevant premiss is false or undercutting 
defeaters which aim to show that the relevant premise has not been 
proved to be true. Oppy's contention seems to be that the critics of the 
kalam cosmological argument have at least succeeded in providing 
undercutting defeaters of its premises and that therefore the argument, 
even if sound, is not successful in proving God's existence. 
If this is in fact the issue, then the question will be the comparative 
warrant enjoyed by the premises and their respective defeaters. If the 
premiss is more strongly warranted than its ostensible defeater, then any 
informed and rational person will, ceteris paribus, accept the soundness 
of the argument. The argument's defender will typically seek to 
decrease the defeater's warrant by defeating it, either rebutting or 
undercutting it, thereby increasing the relative warrant of the premiss 
under attack. The question at hand, then, will be whether the defeater-
defeaters I offered in answer to the above-named critics succeed in refut-
ing their proffered defeaters. 
This seems, as I say, to be the issue; but upon arriving at a postscript 
appended to Oppy's article, the reader discovers that for Oppy this is 
not at all the issue. Just as George Mavrodes criticized Plantinga for 
being overly stringent about what passes as a successful piece of natural 
theology,s so an anonymous referee complained that Oppy is demand-
ing too much of the kalam argument if it must be such that no informed 
person who understands its premises and sees its logical validity will 
reject its conclusion." In the face of this criticism, Oppy revises his claim: 
he now charges that the kalam argument is not "provisionally rationally 
compelling for its intended audience."7 Oppy explains this notion as 
follows: 
A. If an argument is logically compelling and proceeds from 
premises to which the intended audience is committed, it is pro-
visionally rationally compelling for its intended audience. 
An argument which meets this condition is deemed "a success," for it 
"forces one's opponent either to accept one's conclusion ... or to revise 
other beliefs."8 Oppy charges that the kalam argument is not even pro-
visionally rationally compelling for its intended audience (namely, pre-
sumptively reasonable agnostics and atheists) because it relies on "phys-
ical and metaphysical theses which members of the target audience 
reject."" 
Now at face value, Oppy's argument is invalid because (A) states 
only a sufficient, not a necessary, condition of an argument's being pro-
visionally rationally compelling for its intended audience. A defender 
of the kalam argument might well maintain that his argument has this 
character because it is logically compelling and proceeds from premises 
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which its intended audience ought to accept (even if they do not) or from 
premises which are warranted for its intended audience (that is, are such 
that the audience will accept them if their cognitive faculties are func-
tioning properly). Oppy probably intended (A) to be stated in terms of 
necessary and sufficient conditions: 
A *. An argument is provisionally rationally compelling for its 
intended audience if and only if it is logically compelling and 
proceeds from premises to which the intended audience is com-
mitted. 
But the kalam proponent might well reject (A*), as I have suggested. 
Perhaps a member of the audience, like some Soviet philosophers I 
heard at the World Congress on Philosophy in 1978, stubbornly rejects 
the premiss that the universe began to exist in defiance of and without any 
counter-explanation of the evidence simply out of a faith commitment to 
dialectical materialism. He has no adequately warranted defeater of the 
kalam proponent's evidence for the truth of that premiss; is the kalam 
argument not therefore rationally compelling with respect to him? 
Oppy thinks not; he says, "Once the conditions for debate-including 
the possession of respect for one's opponents-break down, questions 
about dialectical success or failure become nugatory."IO Perhaps Oppy's 
point is that one's intended audience must be "presumptively reason-
able," so that once that presumption fails, an argument cannot be provi-
sionally rationally compelling for them. But clearly one may regard 
one's audience as generally reasonable, even if in the case of premises 
implying theism they believe irrationally. If they are generally reason-
able people" but refuse to believe some of one's premises despite their 
want of a suitable defeater, then it seems to me that one can legitimately 
claim "dialectical success." Dialectical success cannot be equated with 
convincing one's opponent (or even forcing him to revise his beliefs); 
after all, many will simply refuse to be convinced. All sorts of psycho-
logical and spiritual factors come into play here for which a philosopher 
cannot be held responsible. Dialectical success in natural theology can-
not, then, be measured merely in terms of success in convincing unbe-
lievers. Christian apologist E. J. Carnell pointed out that one of the pur-
poses of apologetics is to remove from the unbeliever any just excuse for 
his not repenting before Cod. l1 That objective is achieved so long as the 
unbeliever is presented sound theistic arguments with substantiated 
premises for which he has no adequately warranted defeater, even if he 
refuses to believe those premises. 
But suppose we accept (A *). Does the kalam argument fail to meet its 
conditions? This is far from obvious. Atheism does not imply the con-
tradictory of either of the argumenfs premises taken separately. The 
unbeliever may simply have never realized the implication of the con-
junction of these premises. Presented with the argument, he may be 
persuaded to become a theist. Or again, he may not accept one of the 
premises, but if the theist can furnish him an argument for that premiss 
based on propositions he accepts or if the theist can furnish a defeater 
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for the defeater which the unbeliever has brought against the premiss, 
then the non-theist may change his mind and come to accept the pre-
miss. Is this mere speculation on my part? Not at all; 1 (and others) 
have seen atheists and agnostics change their minds when presented 
with the kalam cosmological argument and become theistsY Thus, hard 
empirical evidence refutes Oppy's claim that the kalam cosmological 
argument is a dialectical failure. 
But suppose Oppy were correct. Of what philosophical significance 
is his conclusion that the kalam argument is not provisionally rationally 
compelling for its intended audience? None at all, so far as 1 can see. 
The argument may still be sound and provide warrant for theistic belief. 
It would just not be very useful in evangelism. Perhaps Oppy's conclu-
sion has the practical implication that the Church should not waste her 
time and resources holding training sessions on how to use the kalam 
cosmological argument to win souls. That would be an important lesson 
in stewardship and missions for which we might thank Oppy; but it is 
not a conclusion of interest to philosophers. 
What all this suggests is that the real issue raised by our trio of critics 
is the question as 1 originally framed it: whether their defeaters are suc-
cessful against the kalam argument or whether these defeaters are not 
themselves refuted at a higher level by the defeater-defeaters 1 offered. 
In answering this question, we should do well to keep in mind the dif-
ference between undercutting defeaters and rebutting defeaters. Part of 
my complaint against these critics is that their proffered defeaters fre-
quently do not so much as even take into account, much less refute, 
alternative positions compatible with theism, so that the theist can easily 
undercut these defeaters by merely mentioning such alternatives. Thus, 
Oppy errs when he advises, "one has two options: one can give up on 
the argument; or one can seek to construct arguments for the con-
tentious premises."13 The defender of the kalam argument need not come 
up with new arguments for a disputed premiss if he can simply under-
cut the defeater offered by the critic. In that case, it is now up to the crit-
ic to provide at a higher level a defeater of the defeater-defeater. 
A. Griinbaum's Critique 
The above strategy will become clearer as we look at specific exam-
ples. Consider first Grunbaum's familiar argument that the universe 
cannot have a cause because a cause must precede its effect temporally, 
which is impossible if space-time began to exist. This defeater attempts 
to show that the conclusion of the kalam argument that the universe has a 
cause is incoherent; it is thus, pace Oppy, an attack on the soundness of 
the argument and, indeed, of Christian theism itself. Now in response to 
this defeater, I offered three different accounts of how God could be 
causally related to the universe's origin," including the hypothesis that 
cause and effect are in this case simultaneous. 1 observed that simulta-
neous causation is routinely discussed in analyses of causation and that 
it is intuitively applicable to the case of creation. All Grunbaum says 
about this alternative is the single sentence:: "I consider the notion of 
240 Faith and Philosophy 
simultaneous causation, as applied to the purported creation of time, 
either unintelligible or, at best, incoherent.// 13 But he gives no reason at 
all for this opinion, and, as I commented, until he does so, his remark is 
purely autobiographical and fails to refute my undercutting defeater.!6 
It is not up to the theist to prove that simultaneous causation is intelligi-
ble and coherent; it is up to the critic to show that it is not. When the 
critic does corne up with some reason, then the theist must undercut or 
rebut it, if he wants to retain rationally the proposed alternative. (In 
fact, I anticipated a possible objection to simultaneous causation which 
Grunbaum might raise and pre-emptively undercut it.!7) But until the 
critic shows some incoherence in the proposed alternative, the Christian 
theist's claim that God caused the origin of the universe has not been 
shown to be incoherent and so remains undefeated, even if the critic 
does not accept the theist's proposed alternative. Thus, Oppy is wrong 
when he asserts that the kalam theorist needs to show to non-theists that 
"it is metaphysically possible that the universe was instantaneously cre-
ated by a supernatural agent."!S Au contraire, all the theist need do to 
defeat the proffered defeater is prove that this notion has not been 
proven to be impossible. 
Does Oppy, then, advance the debate by showing some incoherence 
in simultaneous creation? Not significantly; he just asserts that "it seems 
plausible to think that the creative actions of rational agents require 
lapses of time between the formation of appropriate intentions and the 
carrying out of those intentions.//19 Again, this single sentence does not 
constitute much of an argument. But to consider it at face value: notice 
that the objection says nothing against the notion of simultaneous causa-
tion, which posits no lapse between an exercise of causal power and the 
production of the effect. Oppy speaks rather of a lapse between the for-
mation of an intention to cause and the exercise of causal power. The 
objection is that temporally prior to God's (simultaneously) causing the 
Big Bang, He would have to form an intention to do so, which is impos-
sible. But Oppy's operative principle is doubly inapplicable to God. For 
an omniscient being like God, there can be no such lapse, since God does 
not need to make up His mind about what He is going to do. 20 And if 
God is timeless sans creation, then He has a timeless intention to create a 
temporal world, in which case there can be no lapse.2! To carry his 
defeater, Oppy needs to show that the doctrines of divine omniscience 
and timelessness are incoherent. Until he provides such arguments, his 
defeater remains undercut. 
In sum, neither Grunbaum nor Oppy succeed in showing that the 
conclusion of the kalam cosmological argument is incoherent. I do not 
pretend that the doctrine of creation does not involve many subtle and 
difficult questions; but precisely for that reason it cannot be defeated by 
easy one-liners such as Grunbaum and Oppy offer.22 
P. Davies's Critique 
Turn, then, to Oppy's defense of Davies's critique of the kalam cosmo-
logical argument. Taking his cue from Davies, Oppy attempts to refute 
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the causal premiss that whatever begins to exist has a cause by appeal to the 
production of virtual particles in the quantum mechanical vacuum.23 
Wholly apart from the disputed question of whether virtual particles 
really exist at all,24 the central point to be made here is that the quantum 
mechanical vacuum on which they depend for their existence is emphat-
ically not nothing. The dynamical properties of vacuous space arise out 
of its interaction with matter and radiation fields, in the absence of 
which "this dynamism of empty space is but a formal abstraction lack-
ing physical reality."25 The quantum vacuum is a sea of fluctuating ener-
gy which gives rise to virtual particles. Thus, virtual particles can hard-
ly be said to arise without a cause. 
Oppy apparently thinks that cosmological models in which the uni-
verse originates via a spontaneous fluctuation from the primordial vacu-
um are distinct from models in which the universe does not violate the 
mass-energy conservation law because the sum total of its positive and 
negative energy is zero. But this is just confused: these are the same 
models, all presupposing the existence of the quantum mechanical vacu-
um which spawns the universe.26 Thus, these models do not subvert the 
causal premiss. Moreover, while these models merited scientific discus-
sion when Davies wrote God and the New Physics back in the early 
1980's, they are today widely rejected and no longer at the center of 
interest.27 
Oppy is willing to engage in metaphysical speculations in order to 
defeat the kalam argument's second premiss that the universe began to 
exist. He suggests, 
one might take the universe to be a distribution of properties 
across an at-Ieast-four-dimensional manifold, and also hold that 
time is merely a local phenomenon-i.e. that none of the dimen-
sions of the manifold is essentially temporal. Those parts of the 
manifold which are non-temporal might be able to provide an 
explanation of the origins of the temporal parts.28 
It is difficult to know what to make of this extremely obscure sugges-
tion; but the best sense I can make of it would be to take it as a descrip-
tion of the Hartle-Hawking model in which time is imaginary prior to 
the Planck time and so indistinguishable from space. Since this model is 
more properly the province of our next critic rather than of Davies, I 
shall reserve comment until we consider Oppy's defense of Hawking's 
critique. 
Finally, Oppy charges that my defeater-defeaters in defense of the 
second premiss often involve objection to critics' gratuitous reification or 
hypostatization of theoretical constructs but that it is not clear that one 
can get a suitably grounded commitment to the reality of the initial 
space-time singularity unless one also takes on the same ontological 
commitments. But since Oppy gives no examples or explanation of how 
this is the case, I must confess that I find the charge quite puzzling. The 
standard Friedman cosmology does not commit one to space-time sub-
stantivalism, four (or more) dimensionalism, the Many Worlds 
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model. Such a model could be of great utility to science, but it would 
not, as Hawking boldly asserts, eliminate the need for a Creator. 
Oppy does not seek so much to defend a realist construal of 
Hawking's model as to claim that the model does not involve such real-
ist commitments. Whether Hawking's claim to eliminate the need for a 
Creator implies a commitment to realism concerning superspace and 
sum-over-histories is, I think, a moot point/2 but the realistic construal of 
imaginary time is essential to Hawking's claim. For it is this feature of 
the model that eliminates the initial singularity by spatializing time, so 
that space-time as we know it originates in a timelessly existing four-
space. It is because time is imaginary that the points along that dimen-
sion prior to the Planck time are not related by the earlier/later than rela-
tions, so that the point which marks the beginning of the universe in real 
time is not prior to other points in imaginary time. Absent this feature 
of the modet the point which is the "South Pole" of the four-dimension-
al hemisphere prior to the Planck time would be the beginning of the 
universe, which Hawking wants to avoid. Thus, contrary to Oppy, the 
whole dispute hangs on a realistic interpretation of the geometry of 
space-time according to which time is an imaginary quantity prior to the 
Planck time. 
Oppy finds as absurd as I do Hawking's suggestion that real time is 
illusory and imaginary time is ontologically real; but he proposes to re-
formulate Hawking's position to make it more palatable. Oppyadvises, 
What he ought to say is that what we call 'real time' is not a 
physically fundamental property of the universe; i.e. from the 
standpoint of basic physical description, what we call 'real time' 
has the same status as 'potable water' or 'visible light.' Of 
course, contra Hawking this is not to impugn the reality of real 
time-and [sic] nor is it to impugn the reality of the singularities 
in real time-though it will, I think, require the insistence that 
real time is merely a local feature of the universe. Since, on this 
view, the singularities in real time are properly contained in the 
real universe, one can be a realist about them without giving up 
the idea that the universe has no boundaries.33 
I take it that the scenario described here is the same as that adumbrated 
in the quotation in the previous section on Davies's critique. 
Unfortunately, what Oppy says here is most obscure. Hawking would 
agree with the first clause in the above quotation. Oppy's gloss on this 
seems to be that having assignable values restricted to the set of the real 
numbers is a contingent property of measurements of time or (from the 
earlier quotation) of that dimension which is time. Where he differs 
from Hawking is that he does not go so far as to deny that real numbers 
are associated with the correct measures of some intervals of time. But 
this show of reserve does nothing to meet the objections I lodged against 
imaginary time, namely, its physical unintelligibility and its metaphysi-
cal incoherence. These difficulties are so severe that my atheist collabo-
rator Quentin Smith felt compelled to interpret Hawking's imaginary 
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Interpretation of quantum physics, superspace, realism about sum-over-
histories interpretation of quantum theory, and so on. The fact of the 
initial cosmological singularity is guaranteed by the General Theory of 
Relativity coupled with the Hawking-Penrose singularity theorems. No 
ontological commitments are required beyond the very general condi-
tions laid down by that theory and those theorems.2" So Oppy has to do 
much more than he has in order to carry his defeater that the standard 
Big Bang model makes the same ontological commitments as its exotic 
competitors. 
Once again, then, we find that Oppy has failed to refute my defeaters 
of Davies's critique. He attempts to offer rebutting defeaters of the first 
premiss by supplying counter-examples, but these alleged counter-
examples turn out upon examination to be spurious. With respect to the 
second premiss, he tries a tu quoque argument to undercut my charge of 
gratuitous hypostatization on the part of the argument's critics, but fails 
to substantiate his charge with specifics. Thus, my defeater-defeaters 
remain intact. 
S. Hawking's Critique 
Finally, we come to Hawking's attempt to defeat the premiss that the 
universe began to exist by his quantum gravity cosmological model. 
Oppy has far too generous an assessment of the Hartle-Hawking 
modepo Far from being physically plausible, it does not seem to be even 
physically intelligible, relying as it does on imaginary time. And far 
from being consistent with the evidence, the model may not even be 
mathematically consistent and in fact fails in its attempt to predict a 
unique wave function of the universe.31 For this reason the model has 
generated virtually no following among cosmologists despite its being 
trumpeted in the popular media. 
My principal complaint against Hawking's model was that it cannot 
be construed as a realistic description of the origin of the universe 
because of its dubious metaphysical presuppositions. I have no objec-
tion to treating Hawking's model instrumentally as a description of a 
universe with a beginning using the formalism of quantum mechanics, 
in which the beginning is suppressed. One might consider profitably 
the analogy of the use of imaginary numbers for the time coordinate in 
the metric of Minkowski space-time, a mathematical trick which sup-
presses the curvature in space-time and so allows one to treat a pseudo-
Euclidean four-space as a Euclidean four-space. Space-time itself, as an 
(ex hypothesi) objectively existing reality, is not changed by this re-
description. It is still a pseudo-Euclidean four-space, but we can treat it 
as if it were Euclidean by using imaginary numbers for the time coordi-
nate. The only change that occurs is on paper. In a similar way, 
Hawking's use of imaginary numbers for the time variable allows one to 
redescribe a universe with an initial cosmological singularity in such a 
way that that point appears as a non-singular point on a curved hyper-
surface. Such a re-description suppresses and literally spatializes time 
as well, which makes evident the purely instrumental character of the 
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regime instrumentally and to maintain that classical space-time popped 
into being out of nothing at the Planck time!34 
Oppy's claim that his interpretation does not impugn the reality of 
the singularities in real time is baffling, since imaginary time is invoked 
precisely to eliminate the cosmological singularities. If one is a realist 
about the singularities, then, pace Oppy, they do constitute boundaries to 
the universe-this is the case even for singularities formed in black holes 
during the real time regime. Oppy later interprets his envisioned sce-
nario as "embedding the space which contains the singularity in a more 
extensive, appropriately contoured, manifold."35 Since singularities are 
singular points in space-time, not space, what Oppy seems to envision is 
that our four-dimensional space-time is embedded in a sort of hyper-
space-time. This metaphysical speculation is not analogous to physical 
theories which suggest that our space-time may involve additional 
(compacted) dimensions. Oppy's idea is that our space-time is four-
dimensional, but that there exists a sort of hyper-time and hyper-space 
in which our space-time exists. How this idea connects with time's 
being only contingently real is unclear. My best guess is that Oppy con-
ceives hyper-space-time to involve imaginary time, and our space-time 
with its real time and real singularities is embedded in it as in a static 
space. It is evident that this scenario bears no resemblance to Hawking's 
model universe. It is also evident that it does nothing to answer my 
objections to imaginary time, but only pushes the problem back a notch. 
Finally, the hypothesis succumbs to the same objection which I lodged 
against Brian Leftow's theory of the existence of temporal entities in 
eternity (which remarkably parallels Oppy's hypothesis as I have inter-
preted it), namely, it is impossible to preserve the reality of tense and 
temporal becoming once time is embedded in a timeless hyper-dimen-
sion. 36 I am far more confident of the reality of tense and temporal 
becoming than I am of the existence of Oppy's hyper-space-time. In fact, 
here again we see the incredible lengths to which non-theists will go in 
order to avoid the existence of a Creator. Apart from an aversion to the-
ism, there is absolutely no reason to adopt a hypothesis so speculative, 
so obscure, and so sterile as Oppy's. 
Concluding Remarks 
Oppy's central failure in his critique of the kalam cosmological argu-
ment is his misunderstanding of the defeater-structure of rationality. He 
does not sufficiently appreciate that one may undercut purported 
defeaters by showing that the defeaters lack appropriate warrant. The 
ball is then in the critic's court; he is called upon to supply the warrant 
for his defeater. Oppy shirks this task, being content with the mere 
assertion that non-theists do not accept the theist's defeater-defeaters. 
Specifically, Griinbaum, Davies, and Hawking all make serious allega-
tions against the premises and conclusion of the kalam cosmological 
argument without adequately supporting their defeaters in light of my 
defeater-defeaters, and Oppy fails to redress the situation. The kalam 
argument thus emerges from the fray unscathed. 
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